Afghanistan and Pakistan have once again found themselves on the brink of open conflict after days of deadly cross-border fighting that exposed the fragility of their long and volatile frontier. Afghan officials said their forces killed 58 Pakistani soldiers in overnight “retaliatory operations,” while Islamabad gave a far lower death toll of 23, describing the attacks as “unprovoked” adding that it killed 200 Taliban fighters.
The exchanges, centred along the 2,600-kilometre Durand Line (which Afghanistan has never recognised), follow accusations by Kabul that Pakistan bombed Afghan territory including: Strikes on Kabul and a market in the country’s east. Pakistan has neither confirmed nor denied involvement, but Afghan Defence Ministry spokesman Enayatullah Khwarazmi said, “Our armed forces are fully prepared to defend the nation’s borders and will deliver a strong response.”
Also read: Afghanistan warns Pak amid deadly clash; Torkham border shut
The border tension has disrupted the Torkham crossing, a vital trade route, and triggered alarm in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have urged restraint, calling for dialogue to “maintain the security and stability of the region.”
‘This fight is inside Pakistan’
Afghan foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, currently in India, denied Islamabad’s accusations that the Taliban harbour members of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan ( TTP ), a banned militant group behind recent deadly attacks inside Pakistan.
Also read: Why India’s Kabul outreach matters now - the Afghan comeback explained
“There is no presence of TTP in Afghanistan now,” he told reporters. “They are Pakistani people from displaced areas and are allowed to live in the country as refugees. The border is more than 2,400 km long—it could neither be controlled by ‘Changez’ nor ‘Angrez’. Strength alone cannot control it. This fight is inside Pakistan.”
Muttaqi accused Islamabad of failing to “take its people into confidence” and of “endangering its own people to please a few.” But he warned that Kabul would act if provoked further: “We want a peaceful resolution of the situation, but if the peace efforts don’t succeed, we have other options.”
From partners to rivals
For decades, Pakistan was considered a patron of the Taliban, providing shelter and support since the group’s emergence in the 1990s.
Pakistan has supported the Taliban since their inception, initially backing the anti-Soviet mujahideen who later formed the group. In the 1990s, Islamabad was one of only three nations to recognise the Taliban regime and was the last to cut ties in 2001. After the US invasion, Pakistan helped the Taliban regroup, offering safe havens and medical aid, which allowed the movement to endure despite heavy battlefield losses.
Islamabad hoped that the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 would secure its western flank and curb cross-border militancy. Instead, it has seen a resurgence of attacks.
However, with the war over, the Taliban no longer relies on Pakistan for sanctuaries or wartime support. Now, it focuses on gaining legitimacy at home, where distrust of Pakistan runs deep. “By lashing out at Pakistan, the Taliban hopes to buy some goodwill from the Afghan public,” Michael Kugelman, the director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center, told Time.com
Analysts say Pakistan’s influence over the Taliban has eroded sharply. “Taliban leaders no longer need refuge across the border or Pakistani assistance,” wrote Foreign Policy, noting that the leverage Islamabad once enjoyed “is at risk of being lost.” The Taliban’s reluctance to act against the TTP reflects not just ideological affinity but also domestic priorities: distancing themselves from Pakistani control helps their pursuit of legitimacy at home.
“Pakistan finds itself in a predicament largely of its own making—the Taliban leadership that it supported throughout much of the 20-year insurgency in Afghanistan is now sheltering militant groups targeting Islamabad,” Joshua White, a professor in international affairs at Johns Hopkins University, told Time.com in July last year.
The TTP’s deadly resurgence
The TTP, listed by the United Nations as an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist organisation since 2011, aims to overthrow Pakistan’s government and impose its own strict interpretation of Islamic law. With an estimated 30,000 to 35,000 members, the group has waged a bloody campaign for nearly two decades, killing hundreds of soldiers, police, and civilians.
Pakistan’s military campaigns including: Operations Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad. once splintered the group, pushing its leaders into Afghanistan. But the Taliban’s victory in Kabul re-energised the TTP, which has since reunited its factions and ramped up attacks. According to the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), violence in Pakistan in 2024 returned to levels last seen in 2015.
A UN report in July 2025 claimed the TTP enjoys “logistical and operational support” from Taliban authorities, a claim Kabul denies. Islamabad, under pressure from growing domestic insecurity, has launched cross-border airstrikes on suspected TTP hideouts and expelled over a million Afghan refugees since last year.
“The inability of the Taliban administration to take concrete action against the TTP has significantly strained relations,” Islamabad-based analyst Tahir Khan told Deutsche Welle. “Unless the issue of the TTP is effectively addressed, meaningful improvement in bilateral ties will remain elusive.”
What next for Pakistan and the Taliban?
The violence along the Durand Line has once again shown how Pakistan’s decades-long strategy of nurturing militant proxies for influence in Afghanistan has backfired. The very groups it once supported are now undermining its internal security.
Pakistan’s interior minister Mohsin Naqvi has accused Afghan forces of firing on civilians, warning that “no provocation will be tolerated.” Islamabad’s retaliatory strikes have reportedly destroyed multiple Afghan border posts and militant camps, though the Taliban claim to have seized several Pakistani outposts in return.
Both sides remain locked in a dangerous cycle of provocation and denial. Kabul insists the TTP problem is “a fight inside Pakistan,” while Islamabad continues to demand action. Yet neither seems willing to take the political or military risks required for a lasting peace.
Until that reckoning comes, the Durand Line will remain what it has always been: not a border of control, but a fault line of crisis.
(With inputs from agencies)
The exchanges, centred along the 2,600-kilometre Durand Line (which Afghanistan has never recognised), follow accusations by Kabul that Pakistan bombed Afghan territory including: Strikes on Kabul and a market in the country’s east. Pakistan has neither confirmed nor denied involvement, but Afghan Defence Ministry spokesman Enayatullah Khwarazmi said, “Our armed forces are fully prepared to defend the nation’s borders and will deliver a strong response.”
Also read: Afghanistan warns Pak amid deadly clash; Torkham border shut
The border tension has disrupted the Torkham crossing, a vital trade route, and triggered alarm in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have urged restraint, calling for dialogue to “maintain the security and stability of the region.”
‘This fight is inside Pakistan’
Afghan foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, currently in India, denied Islamabad’s accusations that the Taliban harbour members of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan ( TTP ), a banned militant group behind recent deadly attacks inside Pakistan.
Also read: Why India’s Kabul outreach matters now - the Afghan comeback explained
“There is no presence of TTP in Afghanistan now,” he told reporters. “They are Pakistani people from displaced areas and are allowed to live in the country as refugees. The border is more than 2,400 km long—it could neither be controlled by ‘Changez’ nor ‘Angrez’. Strength alone cannot control it. This fight is inside Pakistan.”
Muttaqi accused Islamabad of failing to “take its people into confidence” and of “endangering its own people to please a few.” But he warned that Kabul would act if provoked further: “We want a peaceful resolution of the situation, but if the peace efforts don’t succeed, we have other options.”
From partners to rivals
For decades, Pakistan was considered a patron of the Taliban, providing shelter and support since the group’s emergence in the 1990s.
Pakistan has supported the Taliban since their inception, initially backing the anti-Soviet mujahideen who later formed the group. In the 1990s, Islamabad was one of only three nations to recognise the Taliban regime and was the last to cut ties in 2001. After the US invasion, Pakistan helped the Taliban regroup, offering safe havens and medical aid, which allowed the movement to endure despite heavy battlefield losses.
Islamabad hoped that the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 would secure its western flank and curb cross-border militancy. Instead, it has seen a resurgence of attacks.
However, with the war over, the Taliban no longer relies on Pakistan for sanctuaries or wartime support. Now, it focuses on gaining legitimacy at home, where distrust of Pakistan runs deep. “By lashing out at Pakistan, the Taliban hopes to buy some goodwill from the Afghan public,” Michael Kugelman, the director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center, told Time.com
Analysts say Pakistan’s influence over the Taliban has eroded sharply. “Taliban leaders no longer need refuge across the border or Pakistani assistance,” wrote Foreign Policy, noting that the leverage Islamabad once enjoyed “is at risk of being lost.” The Taliban’s reluctance to act against the TTP reflects not just ideological affinity but also domestic priorities: distancing themselves from Pakistani control helps their pursuit of legitimacy at home.
“Pakistan finds itself in a predicament largely of its own making—the Taliban leadership that it supported throughout much of the 20-year insurgency in Afghanistan is now sheltering militant groups targeting Islamabad,” Joshua White, a professor in international affairs at Johns Hopkins University, told Time.com in July last year.
The TTP’s deadly resurgence
The TTP, listed by the United Nations as an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist organisation since 2011, aims to overthrow Pakistan’s government and impose its own strict interpretation of Islamic law. With an estimated 30,000 to 35,000 members, the group has waged a bloody campaign for nearly two decades, killing hundreds of soldiers, police, and civilians.
Pakistan’s military campaigns including: Operations Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad. once splintered the group, pushing its leaders into Afghanistan. But the Taliban’s victory in Kabul re-energised the TTP, which has since reunited its factions and ramped up attacks. According to the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), violence in Pakistan in 2024 returned to levels last seen in 2015.
A UN report in July 2025 claimed the TTP enjoys “logistical and operational support” from Taliban authorities, a claim Kabul denies. Islamabad, under pressure from growing domestic insecurity, has launched cross-border airstrikes on suspected TTP hideouts and expelled over a million Afghan refugees since last year.
“The inability of the Taliban administration to take concrete action against the TTP has significantly strained relations,” Islamabad-based analyst Tahir Khan told Deutsche Welle. “Unless the issue of the TTP is effectively addressed, meaningful improvement in bilateral ties will remain elusive.”
What next for Pakistan and the Taliban?
The violence along the Durand Line has once again shown how Pakistan’s decades-long strategy of nurturing militant proxies for influence in Afghanistan has backfired. The very groups it once supported are now undermining its internal security.
Pakistan’s interior minister Mohsin Naqvi has accused Afghan forces of firing on civilians, warning that “no provocation will be tolerated.” Islamabad’s retaliatory strikes have reportedly destroyed multiple Afghan border posts and militant camps, though the Taliban claim to have seized several Pakistani outposts in return.
Both sides remain locked in a dangerous cycle of provocation and denial. Kabul insists the TTP problem is “a fight inside Pakistan,” while Islamabad continues to demand action. Yet neither seems willing to take the political or military risks required for a lasting peace.
Until that reckoning comes, the Durand Line will remain what it has always been: not a border of control, but a fault line of crisis.
(With inputs from agencies)
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